

THE REAL BASIS OF '97 DEMOCRACY

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THE REAL BASIS OF DEMOCRACY

THERE are three chief types of Government: (1) Autocracy, or Government by one; (2) Oligarchy, or Government by a few; (3) Democracy, or Government by all. As the work of governing a country is the most important that a man can take in hand, as it demands the very highest qualities both of intellect and character, it is clear that in an ideal world the rulers, whether one or few or many, would be the very best men that could be found. When the King of Prussia, at his coronation, puts the crown on his own head, he implies that he is the best man in the land, that he is the chosen of God, that he is the supreme ruler by right as well as by might. So, too, in an oligarchically governed country, when the ruling classes call themselves the aristocracy, they say in effect that the Government, which happens to be in their hands, is in the hands of the best. But what of democracy? We cannot all be the best; but there is no inherent reason why we should not all be equally good. If supreme merit in a ruler is the real—or ideal—basis of autocracy, if the superior merit of a ruling class or caste is the real basis of oligarchy, the real basis of democracy must be the fundamental equality of all the citizens in the State.

But are men fundamentally equal? Is it conceivable that they should ever be so? Is not society based on inequality, on a bewildering diversity of gifts, attainments, and achievements, on inequality in material possessions, in social position, in influence, in education, in learning, in culture, in mental ability, in aptitudes, in accomplishments, in moral qualities, in spiritual gifts? So some of my readers will protest; and I will say in reply that they have not overstated, and cannot possibly overstate, their case. In what sense, then, do I use the word equality? In

the sense in which it is used by Christianity when it teaches us that all men are equal in the sight of God—equal because they have immortal souls to be lost or saved. The notation in which this teaching is set forth may not commend itself to all of us, but the psychology which underlies it is, I think, profoundly true. When we say that all men are equal in the sight of God, we mean, I imagine, that they are intrinsically equal, equal by reference to an absolute and infallible standard of worth. And they are intrinsically equal because they all have immortal souls to be lost or saved. What does this mean? It means, I imagine, that in each of us there are infinite potentialities waiting to be realised; that so far as we realise these we save our souls, in the sense of finding them; that so far as we neglect to realise them, we lose our souls, in the sense of failing to find them. By comparison with these infinite potentialities, the actual inequalities in which life abounds, and of which we make so much, shrink to zero, and men are seen to be fundamentally equal. And if men are fundamentally equal, the right to share in the government of the community to which one belongs, and to that extent to shape one's own destiny, to give effect to one's own ideals, to order one's own goings, is obviously inherent in the right to live one's own life and realise one's own soul.

How comes it, then, that the Christian doctrine of equality in the sight of God has counted for so little in the social and political life of Christendom? Chiefly, I think, because the unhappy distinction between what is religious and what is secular in life, between the Church and the world—itself the outcome of the yet more fundamental distinction between the Supernatural and Nature—has led us to think of the immortal soul as something quite apart from the ordinary human being, something in fact which belongs to another life and another world, and to think of salvation—which for many centuries meant, and for many minds still means, escape from hell-fire—as an end to be achieved by almost any means but that of living one's everyday life as a member of a social community and a citizen of the world. And so we have been content to say that men are equal in the sight of God because of their immortal souls, and yet to emphasise their

“inherent and congenital inequality” in all the things which really matter, and to base on this supposed inequality our social and political systems and the whole view of life which those systems at once express and control. But if men are unequal, inherently and congenitally unequal, in such matters as mind, character, judgment, taste, manner, and so forth, what is the value of that thing in respect of which they are supposed to be equal—the immortal soul? If we are to think of the immortal soul as a shadowy something, far removed from our daily life, if the things which affect its welfare are matters with which the Government of a country need not seriously concern itself, shall we not at last, as our daily life gains in interest and complexity, cease to concern ourselves with the shadowy something and even come to regard it as non-existent? Then the doctrine of inequality will have triumphed both in theory and practice, and the doom of democracy will have been pronounced.

But surely the immortal soul, if there is such a thing, is not a shadowy something belonging to another life and another world, but on the contrary the supreme reality of this life and this world—the unity and totality of the various aspects and manifestations of man’s many-sided being. Surely it is this and even more than this. In our attempts to rehabilitate, or rather to resubstantiate the soul, we are faced by a difficult problem. If the soul is the unity and totality of man’s being, how are we to reconcile our presumed equality in respect of it with our actual inequality in respect of mind, character and the other vital aspects of man’s being? So far as I can see, there is but one solution of this problem—a solution which has already been provisionally suggested. The soul is something more than the unity and totality of man’s being. It is also—and above all—its infinity. Life is self-realisation. Actually we are finite. Potentially we are infinite. We realise self in different directions and different degrees. In respect of these we are unequal. But we have limitless reserves of potentiality to draw upon; and in respect of this we are equal. And this equality, being rooted in the infinite, overpowers and effaces our inequalities, which are always measurable and finite. It is this principle of infinitude, and

therefore of equality, in men which the great seers of the world have discerned and affirmed, and in affirming which they have boldly taught, not skirting from the apparent paradox, that all men are equal in the sight of God.¹ Nor have they, in calling upon men to realise their august destiny, raised inequality itself, as some might think, to a higher power. Differences of achievement will always be finite and measurable; but in the supreme achievement, when the finite expands into the infinite, the category of the equal and unequal will be finally effaced. I mean by this that between the finite and the infinite there is no such thing as equality or inequality—an arithmetical conception which holds good only of differences within the limits of the finite. If a man could realise his infinite potentialities and so find his true self, he would know that he was one, vitally and essentially one, with all his fellow-men. The idea of being greater or less than others would therefore have no meaning for him. That point of view, that way of looking at things would have passed for ever out of his life.

I will now try to show that the principle of infinitude which we call the soul is no elusive phantom, but an inexhaustible fountain of potentiality, on which we are always drawing, and in realising which, as we take it up, little by little, into our conscious being, we carry on all but the purely physical processes of our life; a fountain from which spring unceasingly all the higher energies which are characteristic of man as man—thought, reason, judgment, insight, emotion, desire, wonder, aspiration, devotion, hope, faith, love; a fountain of latent capacity, latent versatility, latent power, latent character, latent will.

I will try to show that this theory of the soul holds good of what we call, for lack of a fitter phrase, the "average man." Let us first think of the average man as a new-born child. At a very early age the child will begin to talk. In what language will he express himself? That will entirely depend on where and by whom he is reared. He has it in him to speak a hundred different

¹ Nowhere in the range of literature is the inherent infinitude of the individual soul proclaimed with such sublime audacity as in Emily Brontë's magnificent couplet:

"The earth which wakes *one* human heart to feeling
Can centre both the worlds of Heaven and Hell."

languages. A friend of mine has brought up an Italian child who was rescued, as a baby, from the earthquake of Messina. That child speaks English like a native. Had there been no earthquake, she would now be speaking an Italian *patois*. Had she been adopted by a Russian, she would be speaking Russian. By a Frenchman, French. By a Chinaman, Chinese. By a Negro, a Negro dialect. In brief she had a capacity for learning any language or any dialect that happened to be spoken by those who surrounded her. And so has every normal child. And as every language and every sub-language—*patois*, dialect, or even provincial accent—has behind it a particular way of thinking and feeling, a particular outlook on life, we may safely conjecture that every child has it in him at birth to adapt himself to as many ways of thinking and feeling, and to adopt as many outlooks on life, as there are languages and sub-languages in this world of ours.

As the child grows up, the choice of a vocation for him will devolve upon his parents or guardians. What will they do? Will they examine his pedigree in order to see for what calling his inherited tendencies have specially fitted him? No, they will look to his environment, past and present, rather than to his lineage. They will look to their own means, to the way in which he has been educated, to the opportunities for continuing his education, to the possibilities of his being trained for a profession, to the possibilities of his being apprenticed to a trade, to the local demand for labour, and other such matters; and they will make their choice for him by reference to those considerations, unless indeed he has some strongly pronounced inclination, of which they approve and which they are in a position to gratify. They will take for granted that if he is of average ability and is reasonably industrious, he will be able, sooner or later, to become proficient at almost any craft, or trade, or profession, for which his circumstances, including his education, past and prospective, have fitted him. They will take for granted that he has it in him to make himself at home in a multitude of different callings, and that it must, in the main be left to circumstances to determine which of these he is to adopt. It is true that aptitudes vary. We cannot all do all things equally well. There is no one who is

not better fitted for some pursuits than for others. But there is no one who cannot, if he chooses, make himself tolerably proficient at any one of a large number of different pursuits. And if the average adolescent, in spite of the cramping pressure to which he has, almost inevitably, been subjected, has it in him to earn his livelihood in so many different ways, does it not follow that his inherent adaptability is practically unlimited—in other words, that he has practically unlimited reserves of potentiality to draw upon? Since the present War began our Army has expanded to ten times its previous strength. How has this been done? By men going into it out of a hundred different callings, and learning what was a new trade for each of them, the trade of war. But though some of these apprentices were doubtless apter pupils than others, so well has the average Englishman, of whatever class or calling, learnt this new trade, that our vast Army is now as efficient as it is resolute and brave. What better proof could be given of the inherent versatility of human nature, of the infinite resourcefulness of the soul?

Let us now make an imaginative experiment. Let us arrange for a hundred babies belonging to a certain country—Germany if you will—to be born and reared in ten foreign countries, ten in each—say in England, France, Russia, Spain, Italy, Sweden, Holland, the United States, the Argentine, Brazil. Let us divide the inhabitants of each of these countries into ten social grades—landowners, peasants, merchants, shopkeepers, clerks, manufacturers, artisans, civil servants, professional men, ministers of religion. And let us arrange in each country for the babies to be brought up in these ten social grades, one in each. Above all let us arrange, in each case, for German influences to be excluded from the baby's life, if not from the day of its birth, then from as near to that date as possible. Let us then look forward some twenty or thirty years. What will have happened? Can anyone doubt that a large majority of the German babies will have become loyal citizens of their adopted countries and respectable members of their respective social grades? Some failures there will have been among them. But probably not a higher percentage than if they had belonged by birth to the various countries which I have

specified, and been born into the social grades in which I have placed them. The chances are that each of them will have accepted the "Kultur" of his particular country and (whether nominally or really) the religion of his particular foster-parents, and will have adopted the prejudices and general outlook on life of his particular social grade.

Consider what this means. Each of the babies had it in him to play a hundred different parts, the part of an English squire, of a French artisan, of a Russian peasant, of an American manufacturer, of a Dutch merchant, of an Italian priest, of a Swedish official, and so on. What vast potential resources he must have had at his disposal! Which particular part he was to play was decided by what we call chance. But potentially he was equal to all the parts and to as many more as we might choose to assign to him. His adaptability in fine reflected that of the whole human race, and the range of his latent capacity had no limit.

In this respect, if in no other, man stands apart from all other living things. Even his friend and companion, the dog, who probably comes next to him in mental and moral development, is separated from him, as regards adaptability, by an impassable abyss. It is true that the dog family can play a great variety of parts. But this has been made possible, as anyone can see at a glance, only by very strict physical differentiation. Hence the supreme importance of breeding, from the dog-fancier's point of view. Vocation, among dogs, is handed down from father to son, not as a tradition, but as a tendency "in the blood." No amount of training could convert a Newfoundland puppy into a sheep-dog, or enable a bulldog to course hares. With man it is entirely different. In spite of the distinctions of colour, with all that they imply, and in spite of a host of minor variations in face or figure, there is but one dominant human type. And that one type, besides being able to adapt itself to all climates and to a vast range of material conditions, can take up an unlimited number of different interests and pursuits. The average baby has it in him, as we have seen, to speak a hundred languages, to belong to a hundred nations, to learn a hundred trades and professions, to play a hundred parts in life.

And the infinitude of the inheritance which he brings with him into the world is of many dimensions. The religious phenomenon known as "conversion," with the sudden transition which it sometimes effects from the very worst in a man to the very best; the winning of V.C.s and other rewards of courage and self-sacrifice by criminals and other "detrimentals" on the field of battle; the upsurging in seasons of supreme crisis of heroism and self-sacrifice from unsuspected abysses in some seemingly commonplace soul; the sudden melting of a hardened heart in the sunshine of sympathy and kindness; the transforming influence of the passion of personal love on a man's whole attitude towards life—these and other phenomena of a kindred nature, which though necessarily rare (for only exceptional combinations of circumstances can produce them) are not therefore to be regarded as abnormal, seem to show that the unfathomed depths of man's generic nature are as illimitable as its lateral range.

It is a wonder [writes one of our War correspondents] that never palls, but is always new: the spirit which these men of ours possess, from no matter what corner of the Empire they may have come. One wonders where the grumblers, the cowards, the mean people whom one thought one met in ordinary life have gone. They are not here. Or, if they are, they are uplifted and transfigured. They doubtless, many of them, could not explain or express it, but some wind has blown upon them, the inspiration of a great cause has come into them, some sense of comradeship and brotherhood inspires them, something has made true soldiers and gallant men of them all.

The transfiguration of the "plain average man" which is described in this passage proves conclusively that there are immense reserves of spiritual vitality in his soul, and that though for the most part these forces lie dormant and undreamed of, they can awake and energise when some great crisis makes its mute appeal to the man's highest self.

What is the explanation of this fundamental paradox? Why is it that whereas on the physical plane our racial inheritance seems to be strictly limited, on the higher levels of our being infinitude seems to be of its very essence? The answer to this question may be given in a single word: *Consciousness*. What consciousness is, how we have acquired it, into what fundamental

factors it admits of being analysed, we cannot say.¹ What we can say is that though foreshadowings and weak beginnings of it are to be found below the level of human life, consciousness is a distinctively human endowment, or rather it is the distinctively human endowment, the feature which, more than any other, differentiates us from all other living things and is therefore characteristic of man as man. Now consciousness, by enabling man to look before and after and also to look all round an ever-widening horizon, throws open to him all the resources of the Universe, and in doing so reveals to him, or begins to reveal to him, corresponding resources to himself. In other words, it raises, or tends to raise, "to infinity" all his powers and tendencies which are not merely physical. Thus it transforms instinct into reason, blind purpose into self-determining will, feeling into fellow feeling, perception into imagination, sensuous enjoyment into the quest of ideal beauty, carnal desire into spiritual love, communal devotion into the "enthusiasm of humanity," the instinct of self-preservation into the thirst for eternal life. In the awakening of consciousness life begins to be aware of its own limitless possibilities. Before consciousness awakes, the current of life flows blindly and instinctively in a narrow channel, between containing walls which it may never overpass. As consciousness awakes, the channel begins to widen, and a tidal wave flows up it fraught with

murmurs and scents of the infinite sea.

I have said that the real basis of democracy is the equality of all men in the sight of God. When we say that men are equal in the sight of God, we mean that there is an equalising element which dwarfs to nothingness all the differences and distinctions to which we cling so fondly. We can now see that this equalising element—the infinite in man—is no metaphysical abstraction, no shadowy mystery, but an ever-present reality, "closer" to us "than breathing," blinding us to its presence by its very excess of light, the medium in which and through which we live and

¹ We may say, if we please, that consciousness is the self-awareness of the soul, or again that it is the self-awareness of life. But no definition can enable us to fathom its fundamental mystery. If we would know what consciousness is we must turn for instruction to consciousness itself, and open our hearts and minds to its dawning light.

move and have our being, the source of all the energies, capacities, and activities which differentiate man from the rest of living things. If men are equal in this sense of the word, democracy, as a principle of government, is founded on a rock. For the right to share in the government of one's country means the right to control the environment in which a man lives and into which his children are born: and if every man, without regard to class or position or property or any other source of inequality, has unlimited reserves of potentiality in himself, and if the realisation of potentiality is effected through reaction to environment, the claim of the lowliest of men to regulate the affairs of the particular community to which he happens to belong is as strong as the claim of the mightiest.

But before we pronounce in favour of democracy, let us examine the title-deeds of the rival types of Government. If equality is the basis of democracy, supreme merit must be the basis of autocracy, and superior merit—in a class or some other governing circle—of oligarchy. What, then, has autocracy to say for itself? Is there anyone to-day, except perhaps the German Emperor, who seriously believes in the divine right of hereditary monarchs? And may there not be moments when even he, the last champion of autocracy, begins to wonder whether supreme merit is always transmissible from father to son? But if it is not so transmissible, how is the succession in a line of autocrats to be provided for? Adoption gave the Roman Empire a sequence of wise and able rulers, but when Marcus Aurelius chose his son Commodus as his successor, his error of judgment, which was irretrievable, revealed the inherent weakness of both systems. Election would resolve itself into a contest between rival caucuses or juntas, and would end by placing a party nominee on the throne. If, by some divine chance, there were a man in this or any other country who was really qualified by wisdom and force of character for autocratic rule, it would be impossible to devise a system by which his supreme merit could be recognised and the crown placed on his brow. Moreover, if there were such a man, and if he could be discovered and the crown offered to him, he would either decline it or accept it temporarily and provisionally,

for he would be the first to realise that for their own sakes the people must learn to govern themselves.

The case for autocracy is hopeless. The case for oligarchy may seem to be stronger, but chiefly because we are apt to assume that *oligarchical* and *aristocratic* are interchangeable terms. The current use of the word *aristocracy* begs a large question. If men are fundamentally unequal, it is right that government should be placed in the hands of the *aristoi*, or best. But are the ruling classes, in this and other countries, really the best? Are they really superior to the rest of the community? And if they are, is their superiority inherent or accidental? That the "upper classes," in whose hands political power is mainly concentrated, have a serious belief in their own inherent superiority, is certain. Comparing themselves with the "lower orders," as they call them, they claim that they have a higher degree of culture, more refined tastes, better manners, a wider range of interests, and a larger outlook on life. This claim may perhaps be conceded. But the upper classes believe that their superiority in these matters is inherent and congenital, instead of being due, as might reasonably be contended, to the advantages which a happier environment has given them, especially in the periods of childhood and adolescence.

This self-flattering assumption may well be challenged. But it has lately received support from an influential quarter— that of biological science. Professor Bateson, the eminent biologist, in his Address to the British Association in Australia, having laid down that the biological theory of "strain" is as applicable to human beings as to plants and animals, goes on to assume, as a self-evident truth, that in modern society the upper classes are of a superior strain to the lower, from which premises he logically concludes that democracy is a vicious type of government. He admits indeed that if the upper classes may be regarded as plums and the lower as bullaces, many plums have been sown among the bullaces and some bullaces among the plums; but this admission does not make his political views the less anti-democratic, for he is careful to explain that the present "instability of society is due, not to inequality, which is inherent

and congenital, but to the fact that in periods of rapid change like the present convection currents are set up such that the elements of the strata get intermixed and the apparent stratification corresponds only roughly with the genetic"; and though he approves of the statesmanship which "aims at helping those who have got sown as wildings to come into their proper place," he adds "let not anyone suppose such a policy democratic in its ultimate effects, for no course of action can be more effective in strengthening the upper classes, while weakening the lower"; and his final contribution to political science is, as might be expected, that "in all practical schemes for social reform the congenital diversity, the essential polymorphism of all civilised communities must be recognised as a fundamental fact; and reformers should rather direct their efforts to facilitating and rectifying class distinctions than to any futile attempt to abolish them."

The theory which Professor Bateson has expounded must surely have originated in Germany. One can imagine with what gusto the Hohenzollerns and the Prussian Junkers would lay its flattering unction to their souls. One might even conjecture that the professor who elaborated it, if of "bullace" origin, was raised to the "plum" level by royal mandate and made a "*von*" in recognition of his newly acquired superior strain. But what is the value, what is the meaning of the theory? When one remembers by what methods the upper classes, in this and other countries and in this and other ages, have gained the upper hand, one begins to wonder what are the qualities, superiority in which differentiates the high-born aristocracy from the low-born populace. Are they, for example, the qualities which Christ pronounced blessed in the Sermon on the Mount? I doubt it. As I turn the pages of History I find that again and again the ungodly flourished like a green bay tree, flourished so triumphantly that he was able to bequeath his ill-gotten prosperity to the third and fourth and even to the tenth generation of his descendants. In such a case did the successful scoundrel bequeath his character as well as his position and wealth? According to Professor Bateson he must have done so. But if he did, there is surely a

flaw in his descendants' title to social and political ascendancy. Professor Bateson has raised an interesting and difficult question. Will he help us to answer it? Are his upper classes an aristocracy of physique, of intellect, of morals, of spirituality? That they are "inherently and congenitally" superior in all four directions is a proposition which those who are well acquainted with both classes will laugh to scorn, and which even Professor Bateson will scarcely have the hardihood to maintain. Were the robber Knights of the Rhine, are the arrogant barons of East Prussia and the Baltic Provinces "high-born"? Are the Franciscan brothers and sisters, whose ideal of life has always been diametrically opposed to that of knight or baron, "low-born"? The pedigree of a dog or a horse is recorded in certain unmistakable features. In what features, inward or outward, does Nature record the pedigree of the high-born or the low-born man? This is a point on which Professor Bateson would do well to enlighten us, but on which he prefers to keep silence.

Let us try to answer the question which he has left unanswered. That his theory of "strain" is wholly incompatible with the hypothesis of man's inherent infinitude, goes without saying. But let us waive that argument for the moment and ask what positive evidence can be brought forward in support of his theory, or rather of its applicability to human nature. He seems to take for granted that the upper classes in this country—the nobility, gentry, and members of the liberal professions, let us say—are mostly plums, and that the lower classes—the peasants, miners and artisans, let us say—are mostly bullaces. Wherein, then, do the upper classes show their inherent and congenital superiority to the lower? That they are of superior physique may perhaps be admitted; though even in this respect the difference between the two classes at birth is comparatively small, the physical superiority of the average adult specimen of the upper classes being largely due to healthier surroundings and better food. That they are superior in mental power is disputable, to say the least. The adult peasant is no doubt less cultured and less intellectual than the average "gentleman," but he has been exposed from his birth, both at home and in school, to much less

favourable influences, and it is to this rather than to any inherited inferiority that his shortcomings, cultural and intellectual, are probably due. What the inherent and congenital mentality of the lower classes really is, or how it compares with that of the upper classes, we do not know. What we do know is that the peasant, the miner, and the artisan are born into a cramping and depressing environment, the product of social and economic causes, from which they cannot easily escape, and in which it is as difficult for their mental powers to unfold as for a tree to thrive in an exposed situation or a poor soil. This fact invites imaginative conjecture as to what might be or might have been. The psychology of Gray's *Elegy*, which wisely limits itself to "perhaps" and "may," is, I believe, absolutely sound :

Perhaps in this neglected spot is laid
Some heart once pregnant with celestial fire ;
Hands, that the rod of empire might have sway'd
Or wak'd to ecstacy the living lyre.

But Knowledge to their eyes her ample page,
Rich with the spoils of time, did ne'er unroll ;
Chill Penury repress'd their noble rage,
And froze the genial current of the soul.

Some village Hampden, that with dauntless breast
The little tyrant of his fields withstood ;
Some mute inglorious Milton here may rest,
Some Cromwell guiltless of his country's blood.

Th' applause of listening senates to command,
The threats of pain and ruin to despise,
To scatter plenty o'er a smiling land,
And read their history in a nation's eyes,

Their lot forbade.

Some such epitaph as this might be written on many a nameless grave in country churchyard or urban cemetery. It was said that in the Napoleonic armies every soldier carried a Field Marshal's baton in his knapsack ; and it is a fact that some of the ablest of Napoleon's lieutenants rose from the ranks. Why ? Because in Republican France the superstition of the congenital inferiority of the lower classes had been temporarily swept away by the Revolution, and because the Republican tradition had been inherited by the Empire and respected by the Emperor, whose

own genius had raised him from obscurity to supreme power, and who was on the look-out for talent in the armies that he led. In the British Army, where the soldiers fought "under the cold shade of aristocracy," the private who, had he been born in France, might have become a Field Marshal, would probably have won his stripes, or at best become a subaltern, and gone no further. The constitution of things was against his rising to the height of his deserts. "His lot forbade" his advancement.

The experiment which the Republican War Ministers initiated and which Napoleon carried on is of lasting interest and opens up a wide vista to speculative thought. Professor Bateson will perhaps contend that the Marshals who rose from the ranks were plums which had got "sown as wildings." But no: a Field Marshal is, *in his own time*, a super-plum, not a plum; and where there is one super-plum there must be thousands and tens of thousands of plums. In the Napoleonic armies, as in the Republican, there was a temporary relaxation of a deadening pressure. If that concession could enable many soldiers who would otherwise in all probability have lived and died in obscurity, to rise to the very highest grade of all, what might not a general equalising of conditions do in the way of raising the lower classes to the mental level of the upper? This is the question which the romantic stories of such men as Murat, Laannes, Ney, Hoche, Angereau, Junot, and other great commanders, compel us to ask ourselves. In our attempts to answer it we can, I think, pass beyond the limits of mere conjecture. A village schoolmistress, to whose work I have elsewhere tried to do justice, was the first to convince me that under favourable conditions, foremost among which is an attitude of trust and encouragement on the part of the teacher, the village boy or girl can easily hold his own with the child of the upper classes in all-round mental capacity, in resourcefulness, in initiative, in versatility, in intellectual power, in literary and artistic taste. Other teachers have since taught me the same lesson. Not long after my discovery of the village which I called "Utopia," the headmaster of an elementary school in the East of London showed me some admirable drawings done by his pupils. I asked him what proportion of his pupils could

reach that level. He answered: "Had you asked me that question a year ago I would have said 5 per cent., but now I can say 95 per cent." As a teacher of drawing he had recently changed his aims and methods. Had he not done so he would have continued to take for granted that 95 per cent. of his pupils had little or no capacity for drawing. More recently I was shown some thirty or forty poems written by girls in a higher-standard elementary school in one of our Northern manufacturing towns. The high level of feeling and expression reached in these poems astonished me.¹ The headmistress explained to me that, being in need of "copy" for the school magazine, she encouraged the girls to try their hands at writing verse. The girls, who had long had access to a good school library containing many volumes of poetry, responded with alacrity. The teacher added that "our poetry is only a very small part of our literature scheme,² the carrying out of which is to the children pure joy; and these poems are only first attempts." Similar discoveries of latent taste and talent in the average elementary school-child are constantly being made. They point to serious defects in our system or systems of education, which do so much for the child, of whatever social grade, and leave so little to his spontaneous activity, that his mind is still in large measure an unexplored land. If education could be reformed in the direction of setting children free to develop individuality and realise latent capacity, it would, I think,

¹ Here is one of the poems:

Late October.

Patter of fitful rain,
Shiver of falling leaves,
And wail of wind that has left behind
The glory of fruit and sheaves.
Mist on the crowning hills,
Mist in the vales below,
And grief in the heart that has seen depart
Its summer of long ago.

A similar and equally successful experiment has been made by Miss Ruth M. Fletcher in the Lower Form of a Girls' Municipal High School. "Original poetry by children," writes Miss Fletcher, "is an interesting subject, but space forbids full discussion here. Enough to state that I have experimented independently in this direction, and am amazed and delighted at the result. I believe that most intelligent children of this age have within them, mostly latent, a vein of poetry—simple and rhythmical, and need only right stimulus to use and delight in the powers." Most of Miss Fletcher's pupils would be of "bullace breed," some being ex-elementary scholars and others the daughters of lower middle-class parents.

² This is quite true. The prose efforts of the children are as remarkable as their poems.

be found that the mental ability of both the upper and the lower classes was much greater than we had imagined it to be. But it would not be found that the mental ability of the upper classes was appreciably greater than that of the lower. Such at least is the conviction which my recent educational experiences and my reinterpretation, in the light which they cast, of former experiences, have forced upon my mind.

The idea that the upper classes are by nature morally and spiritually superior to the lower is a dangerous delusion, of which, for their own sakes, those who belong to the upper classes would do well to rid themselves. If the lower classes fill more than their share of our prison cells, the reason is that many of them are born into and reared in criminal surroundings, that they are beset by temptations to dishonesty and other forms of lawlessness, to which the upper classes are not exposed, and that, in spite of the desire of our legislators to do justice to all classes, there is still one law for the rich and another for the poor.¹ Criminality is not viciousness. The lower classes may be more criminal than the upper, in the sense of being more frequently convicted of offences against the law, but they are certainly not more vicious. If anything, they are less selfish and less worldly. But this too can easily be explained. The disadvantages of environment are not all on the side of the poor. The rich are exposed to temptations from which the poor are largely, if not wholly, exempt. It was said of old by One who taught with authority that "it is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter into the Kingdom of God." Did not Christ mean by this that material prosperity, with its temptations to self-indulgence—a hydra-headed vice, to worldliness, with the perversion of ideals which it involves, and to arrogance, with its acceptance as final of an outward standard of value, is ever tending to distract the prosperous from the inward life? Bearing these things in mind, let us hold the scales even between the two classes and say that on the moral and spiritual planes neither class is inherently superior to the other. The present War has proved to demonstration that there are vast reserves of heroism and self-devotion.

¹ See Judge Parry's book *The Law and the Poor*, *passim*.

in human nature, and that in this respect the upper classes are not more richly endowed than the lower, nor the lower classes than the upper. One of our officers, writing from the Front, says of his men:

I'm not emotional but . . . since I've been out here in the trenches I've had the water forced into my eyes, not once, but a dozen times, from sheer admiration and respect, by the action of rough, rude chaps whom you'd never waste a second glance on in the streets of London, men who, so far from being exceptional, are typical through and through, just the common street average. . . . Under the strain and stress of this savage existence those men show up for what they really are under their rough hides: they are jewel all through . . . and the daily round of their lives is simply full of little acts of self sacrifice, generosity and unstudied heroism.

And our men at the Front have often written in equivalent terms of their officers. The truth is that, in response to the stimulus of this tremendous War, sublime qualities are ever awaking which exist as possibilities in those hidden depths of our nature where distinctions of class and breeding are unknown, and which are therefore, in the real meaning of the phrase, characteristic of man as man. In the Kingdom of Heaven there is no such thing as "strain."

Far from shaking my faith in the fundamental equality of all men, Professor Bateson, the apostle of human inequality, has indirectly confirmed it, for he has led me to examine the evidence for his anti-democratic assumption, with the result that the "inherent and congenital" superiority of the upper to the lower classes, which he takes for granted, has resolved itself into a doubtful superiority in physique. This is but a slender basis on which to build a claim to political supremacy. On the higher levels of human nature such phrases as *well-born*, *high-born*, *well-bred*, *good birth*, *good breeding*, and their opposites have no meaning. Or rather, so far as they have a meaning, they indicate superiority or inferiority in respect of environment, not of breed. The infinitude, which is of the essence of human nature, is as much the birthright of the peasant or the miner as of the plutocrat or the peer. The biological theory of strain, when applied to human beings, may lend its countenance to the arrogance of those who are born into high places. But that proves nothing except that, like the arrogance which it seems to countenance, the theory, as

an interpretation of human nature, is profoundly materialistic at heart. The philosophy of life which resolves psychology into biology is vitiated by one fundamental fallacy. It ignores the transforming, expanding, sublimating power of consciousness. It ignores the soul.

So much for the theoretical basis of democracy. What is the practical basis? When I use the word "practical" I am not thinking of the activities of politicians: I am not thinking of caucuses, conventions, unions of democratic control, or other such contrivances. These things belong to the machinery of political organisation: and it is possible for the machinery of democratic organisation to have been ingeniously contrived and to work smoothly and effectively, and yet for its chief function to be that of enabling ambitious and unscrupulous demagogues—true descendants of the robber knights of the Middle Ages—to exploit the people, in the sacred name of democracy, for their own selfish ends. The practical basis of democracy is the spread of the democratic spirit—the spirit of fundamental equality—among men. Till that spirit has permeated the people, we may elaborate and over-elaborate the machinery of democratic government, but we shall not arrive at democracy.

And we are still far from that goal. Centuries of political progress are behind us; but the feudal rather than the democratic spirit is still in the air that we breathe. The tenacity of feudalism, its survival of its own apparent dissolution, is due in part to its being the logical development of a great philosophical principle. If trust in human nature, recognition of the infinite in man, is at the heart of the philosophy of democracy, distrust of human nature, denial of the infinite in man, is at the heart of the philosophy of feudalism. The infinite, as feudalism conceives it, is outside man, outside Nature, outside the world of our experience, enthroned in an unimaginable world of its own. From that supernatural source authority is delegated to the overlords of the earth, from whom it descends by a process of devolution from grade to grade—from emperor to king, from king to duke, from duke to count, from count to knight—till we come at last to the

mass of the people, whose sole political privilege is to obey. Under the feudal system authority was inherent in the ownership of land, the supreme landlord being the supernatural God ; and where the ownership of land ceased, political power and responsibility ceased with it. With the decay of feudalism as a political system, and the development of commerce, manufacturing industry, and urban life, the contrast between the land-owning and the landless classes reproduced itself in the field of industrial activity, as the contrast between capital and labour, and in general broadened out into the contrast between the haves and the have-nots, between the rich and the poor. Feudalism, as a political system, has long since passed away ; but the after effects of an order of things in which authority descended from the apex to the base of the social pyramid, and was held to be inherent in the ownership of property, are with us still. The worship of rank, of riches, and on a lower level—of respectability, the tyranny of class-distinctions, the thirst for material possessions as the ultimate source of political power, of social influence, of well-being, and even of happiness, are as strong to-day as they ever were. Materialised ideals, outward standards of value, undue regard for appearances still rule our hearts. And as the able and ambitious men in every grade are not unnaturally consumed with a desire to struggle upwards to higher grades, and as the association of power and position with property encourages a general scramble for possessions, we cannot wonder that competition, rather than co-operation, is still the master principle of our social life, or that, if we do co-operate, our motive in doing so is too often competitive, our forces being united for purposes of aggression or defence. So long as this spirit is in the ascendant, democratic institutions, whatever form they may take, will prove but a mockery or a fraud. Class may array itself against class, labour against capital, the landless against the landlords, and so on ; but so long as these movements are dominated by competitive selfishness, so long as our attempts to redress inequality are controlled by the avowed desire for an impossible outward equality or by the secret desire to establish a new inequality, so long as we are the victims of the delusion that equality is a matter of

outward possessions rather than of inward life, we may get revolutions of various kinds but we shall still fall far short of democracy.

If we wish to arrive at democracy, we must, I repeat, cultivate the democratic spirit. What, then, is the democratic spirit? In answer to this question the historical formula "*Liberty, Equality, Fraternity*," rises of its own accord to my lips. In this formula the key word is *Equality*, which is properly placed in the middle. If that word is rightly interpreted, the formula is transcendent sense. If it is wrongly interpreted, the formula is worse than nonsense. If the equality of which we dream is outward and material, if it is to be achieved, for example, by the forcible spoliation of the rich, we must not be surprised if the man of property gives us, as his version of the formula: "*Anarchy, Robbery, Conspiracy*." But if the equality of which we dream is inward and intrinsic, if its source is the principle of infinitude, the divine spirit in man, then the supporting words—*Liberty* and *Fraternity*—will discover in themselves new depths of meaning, and the formula as a whole will become the expression of a glorious ideal of life.

Liberty, Equality, Fraternity. If we are to have equality we must have liberty; and if we have equality we shall have fraternity. Let me try to explain what I mean. If the equalising element in us is to have fair play, if we are to begin to realise our infinite possibilities, we must have freedom for self-development. For self-development means development by self as well as of self, and the business of growing must in the main be done by the thing that grows. When we say that our reserves are infinite, we of course imply that no one, in the space of one brief life, can hope to realise them. The baby has it in him to speak a hundred languages; but the chances are that he will speak only one. The adolescent has it in him to play a hundred parts in life; but the chances are that he will play only one. What a man can do and should aim at doing is to keep alive and even develop his capacity for self-development. It is in this respect that men are unequal, man differing from man, and class from class. The differences between man and man are partly congenital, mainly environmental.

The differences between class and class are, as far as I can see, wholly environmental. The upper classes may have a greater capacity for self-development than the lower: but we have no evidence that their superiority, whatever it may amount to, is congenital, whereas we have ample evidence that they have been born into and reared in a larger, freer, and less monotonous environment. This will account for their greater adaptability and their wider outlook. We are all creatures of habit, and we are all apt to get into grooves and stay in them and therefore the stronger the pressure that is applied to us and the narrower the surface on which it operates, the more likely we are to yield to it, and in doing so to stunt our growth and contract the scope of our life.

Let me take an extreme case. In ancient days civilisation was based on slave labour. What chance had the slave of developing or even keeping alive his capacity for self-development? If you insist on ordering a man's goings for him, he will gradually lose the power of ordering them for himself. The slave had all his goings ordered for him. From morning to evening, from day to day, from year to year, he was subjected to the maximum of disciplinary pressure; and his environment, which was wholly under the control of his master, was narrow, rigid and monotonous. A Stoic, like Epictetus, or a Christian devotee, might be able to retire from this tyranny into the fortress of his inmost soul, and there find freedom and life. But the average slave could scarcely fail to succumb to the tremendous pressure which was brought to bear on him; and we must not blame him if at last he fell below the level of normal manhood and became little better than an animated machine.

Slavery has passed away, but the liberty which makes for equality has not yet come. One cannot spend much time in the deep and dreary slums of our great industrial centres, without feeling that the dwellers in those regions, though they may be free and independent electors, are in bondage to a social and economic pressure which is hurtful to their higher interests and from which they find it hard to escape. They pass their lives in dull, ugly, sordid, depressing surroundings. They spend, as a rule, ten hours a day in monotonous and mechanical work. The quickening and

illuminating influences of nature, literature, and art are in large measure withheld from them. At any rate, they are not at their doors. If growth is brought about by reaction to stimulus, what kind of growth can men who are doomed to live in such an environment be expected to make? All honour to those among them who have kept their capacity for self-development unimpaired. If they are a minority, the majority are to be sympathised with, not blamed. Sympathised with, and still believed in. The iron has entered into their souls, but it has inflicted no mortal wound. Their reserves of potentiality are still limitless; and a supreme crisis would probably reveal the latent greatness of their souls. But their power of drawing on their reserves has been seriously impaired; and both as citizens and as men they have suffered from the undue restriction of their liberty by a social system which is economically and therefore politically unsound.

If we are to realise our inherent equality, we must have freedom for self-development, we must be relieved, as far as possible, from cramping, stunting, deadening constraint. And in proportion as we realise our inherent equality, the sentiment of fraternity will grow and spread among us. For the infinite in man is something more than the source of equality among men. It is also the source of unity. It is the one sure solvent of individualism. The individual can keep many things to himself, claim them as his own, speak of them as his property, and exult in the possession of them. But he cannot keep the infinite to himself. That, the greatest of all his possessions, is his on condition that he shares it with all other men. No man, not even the German Emperor, has proprietary rights in God. The more fully a man realises his latent infinitude, the more successful he is in finding his own soul, in making good his claim to the prize which is worth more to him than the whole world, the stronger is his sense of being one, in it and through it, with all other men. The sentiment of fraternity is the sense of equality worked out to its legitimate conclusion by the logic of the heart—the sense of equality touched with emotion, transformed into an enthusiasm, a passion, a glow of sympathy, a flame of love. With the acceptance of equality, not merely as a philosophical principle or as a

psychological truth, but also and more especially as a personal experience, the individual ceases to live to himself: but this is a gain to him rather than a loss, for he renews his life on a larger scale by merging it in the life of his kind.

The democratic spirit, then, is compounded of three elements, the sense of equality, the desire for liberty, and the sentiment of fraternity; and these three are not three but one. But how are we to get the democratic spirit into the various classes of our still feudalised society? For it must dominate all classes if the day of democracy is to come. Alas! as I have already confessed, we are still deep in our old grooves. We still worship our old idols—position, property, power. The spirit of competition is still in the ascendant, the very efforts that we make to co-operate being largely under its control. The old watchword, the battle-cry of individualism—"Each for himself and the devil take the hindmost"—still retains, in practice, if not in theory, some measure of the black magic of its charm. Living in this sinister tradition, breathing this polluted atmosphere, what shall we do to be saved?

Well, if we adults are past praying for—I do not say that we are, nay, I am very sure that we are not, but in any case—why should we not begin where we ought always to begin, and where we ought to have begun long ago—with our children? Nothing astonishes me so much as the indifference of the average English parent to the social aspect of the education which his children are receiving. Such interest as he takes in the matter is, as a rule, merely snobbish, being limited to the desire that his children should consort with those who are above rather than below his own social status. With the socialising influence of education on his children he does not concern himself in the slightest degree. The democrat is well content that his children should attend schools which are still dominated by the feudal tradition of devolved authority, inherent inequality, and personal ascendancy. The socialist is well content that his children should be taught by men who can think of no better way of rousing their pupils to exertion than that of appealing to their competitive instincts, with the baser passions—envy, jealousy, vanity and the like—

which are implicit in these. The democrat does not see that the feudal spirit is as antagonistic to the democratic in a school as in a political community, and that when the child becomes a citizen he will probably cling to the tradition in which he was reared. The socialist does not see that those who, as children, are forced to compete against one another will be reluctant to co-operate with one another when they go out into the wide world.

Education, as it is conducted to-day in most civilised countries, seems to be at open war with the democratic ideal of liberty, equality, fraternity. The children who attend school are despotically governed and compulsorily disciplined, instead of being helped to govern and discipline themselves. In this way violence is done to their natural and quite legitimate desire for liberty, a desire which is generated by their inborn instinct for self-development. They are compulsorily instructed instead of being helped to instruct themselves. A cut-and-dried curriculum is imposed on them, with or without their consent, and no attempt is made to discover, or help them to discover, in what directions their talents really lie. The result is that an arbitrary standard of intellectual worth is applied to them, by reference to which glaring inequalities among them speedily reveal themselves, inequalities which are accepted by both teachers and taught as congenital and inherent, and therefore as ultimately decisive of destiny, and which are duly registered by the teacher, and even numerically appraised. In this way violence is done to the sense of equality which is latent in all children, and which is ready to assert itself whenever it is given fair play. And as the regime of compulsory discipline and compulsory instruction is distasteful to the healthy child, in order to induce children to exert themselves they are urged and even compelled to compete against one another for prizes and other marks of distinction, and are thus taught to regard their classmates as rivals instead of as fellow-workers and friends. In this way violence is done to the nascent spirit of fraternity,—the spirit of comradeship, of co-operation, which has made possible the communal life of man.

The reform of education, then, in the direction of relaxing unnecessary pressure, removing unnecessary restrictions and, in

general, giving the child space to grow in and fresh air to breathe, must precede that diffusion of the democratic spirit which is to prepare the way for the advent of democracy. Feudalised education leads of inner necessity to the ascendancy of the feudal spirit in society; and so long as that spirit is in the ascendant, it will either thwart or misdirect whatever movements we may make towards the realisation of the democratic ideal. Therefore, if we are really devoted to the cause of political and social reform, our first aim must be to de-feudalise education. How is this to be done? We must begin by recognising that the ultimate source of authority in education is not the will of the teacher, but the unfolding spirit of the child. Let this fundamental truth be realised, and reforms which embody it will follow of their own accord and in their own good time. Instead of basing our whole educational system on profound distrust of the child's nature we shall gradually learn to base it on faith in the inherent sanity of the great forces which are at work in his expanding life, in the limitlessness of his unrealised reserves of capacity, and in the general orientation of his nature towards good. We shall then relax the rigour of a discipline which takes for granted that the child is a potential rebel and criminal, and which therefore does its best to crush his spirit and mechanicalise his life. And we shall relax the rigidity and formality of a system of instruction which takes for granted that the child is as stupid and helpless as he is ignorant, and which, by forcibly cramming him with information, does its best to starve his desire to win knowledge for himself. And in general we shall relax the dogmatic and dictatorial attitude which reflects our traditional conviction that the mind of the child is at best a blank page waiting to be written on and that his character is at best unknaded clay.

If we will make the experiment of giving freedom to the child, and persevere in it in spite of inevitable mistakes and failures, results will follow in due season which will surprise us. Relieved from the deadly pressure which was paralysing his natural activities and therefore either arresting or distorting his expansive tendencies, free at last to obey the laws of his own being rather than the arbitrary commands of his teacher, the child will begin to

make healthy and harmonious growth: and his consequent sense of well-being will be realised by him as joy. In the vitalising atmosphere of joy his deeper nature will begin to reveal itself. His secret desire for liberty having been gratified, the sense of equality will begin to awake in him. By this I mean that his competitive instinct, which we, his seniors, have so basely exploited, will be gradually swamped, and at last wholly submerged, by the rising tide of fellow-feeling and good-will. Instead of measuring himself against his classmates and either envying their prowess or priding himself on surpassing them, he will learn to regard them as his fellow-workers and comrades, as sharers with him in the life and well-being of a social community, and will therefore learn at last to take as great a pride in their achievements as in his own. This is no mere dream of what might be. It is a prophecy, based on experience of what has actually happened in more schools than one. In the village school which I have already mentioned, prizes, marks of distinction, orders of merit, and all their pernicious kindred, were entirely unknown, and any attempt to introduce them into the school would have been strongly resented by the children themselves. If a child had a special gift for drawing or any other subject, his reward for doing good work at it was to be allowed to help those who were less proficient than himself, and, if possible, raise them to his own level. And as no artificial standard of measurement prevailed in the school, and as all the children were encouraged to cultivate their natural tastes and aptitudes, the clever draughtsman—let us say—was free to remind himself that, if he was strong where some of his classmates were weak, he might well be weak where some of his classmates were strong.

Looking back to the days which I spent in that school, I can say, without hesitation, that it was a perfect social community, in which the spirit of liberty, equality, fraternity was fully realised, in which each lived for all and all for each, in which the development of the children was in the highest degree healthy, vigorous and many-sided, in which the prevailing atmosphere was one of sympathy, good-will, and joy.

I have visited other schools in which the same spirit was

producing similar results. If schools of that type were the rule instead of the rare exceptions, the social Kingdom of Heaven, which is also the spiritual Kingdom of Heaven, would be at hand.

The spread of the democratic spirit among the young is not the only preparation of democracy which the reform of education may be expected to make. I have said that actually, though not congenitally, the upper classes have a greater capacity for self-realisation than the lower. I do not think they owe this superiority, such as it is, to their school education. At any rate, they owe it in a far higher degree to the general advantages of their environment, especially in the days of childhood and adolescence—to their homes, their surroundings, their friends, their opportunities for travel and self-improvement, and above all to the leisure which makes it possible for them, through the medium of books and periodicals, to get into touch with all the ages and with all parts of the world. Taken as a whole, their environment is larger, more varied, more stimulating, and therefore more educational, in the deeper and truer sense of the word. If the poor cannot secure these advantages for their children, there is the more reason why the education given in our elementary schools should be of such a character as to keep alive and even foster the child's natural capacity for realising his latent possibilities. Now, as it happens, the type of education which will best secure this end coincides at every point with the type of education which will best promote the growth of the democratic spirit in the rising generation. Give a child freedom for self-development, release him from the cramping and deadening pressure of autocratic authority, rigid discipline, and mechanical instruction—and two things will happen. The spirit of liberty, equality, and fraternity will begin to germinate in his heart, and his capacity for realising capacity, for making the most of his natural aptitudes and inclinations, will at least be kept alive. With such a school life behind him, he will be animated, when he grows up, by the true spirit of democracy, and he will also be ready to play his part as a useful and efficient member of the community, and to take a hand in the great work of governing the community, and the still greater work of governing himself.

The psychology from which I have deduced my political philosophy may seem to some of my readers fantastic and even paradoxical. Yet it ought to be familiar to all who call themselves Christians. For I have but taken seriously two of the leading tenets of the Christian faith. The doctrine of the Incarnation and the doctrine of the Holy Spirit proclaim, each in its own way, the potential divinity of man. The essence of the doctrine of the Incarnation is that Very Man is Very God. The essence of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit is that the indwelling spirit of God is the life of our life and the soul of our soul. The seers and sages of Ancient India proclaimed the same truth in other words when they taught that the soul of the Universe, the "unbeholden essence" of all things, is the true self of each of us. We do not take this great truth seriously. We give a formal assent to the doctrines which enshrine it, and then leave these for the theologians to deal with, while we devote ourselves to secular pursuits. The doctrines may have a meaning for us—so we seem to think—between certain hours on Sunday, and for our children during the first half-hour of morning school on weekdays. But they do not otherwise concern us; and we take good care that they shall not enter into and dominate our daily lives. The consequent loss to our daily lives is immeasurable. If the true self of each of us is infinite and even divine, ought not self-development—the unfolding of our latent powers, the realising of our limitless possibilities, the opening of our hearts to the creative spirit of God—to be the central purpose of our lives, the basis of our culture, the basis of our morals, the basis of our social organisation, the basis of our political aims? In the light of this master-principle should not we who believe in democracy see a deeper meaning in *liberty*, without which self-development is impossible, in *equality*, which reflects the presence of the infinite in our souls, in *fraternity*, which is the natural outcome of our oneness with and oneness in God? I ask that we shall take this truth, if it is a truth, away from the theologians and bring it into our daily lives. When once the leaven of it has begun to work in our hearts, new vistas will open before us, and ideals which we had thought impracticable will come within the compass of our forethought.

and our will. I am no prophet, and I will not pry into the future; but I must be allowed to dream that one of the ideals which will then begin to materialise will be the reconstruction of society on a genuinely democratic foundation.

But even in our dream of that possible millennium we must remind ourselves again, and yet again, that without the democratic spirit no democratic institution can serve its purpose or endure. If the theoretical basis of democracy is recognition, the practical basis of it is realisation, of the divine element in man. The Kingdom of Heaven is a community as well as an inward state; but if we are to realise it as a community we must also realise it as an inward state.